AI Weekly Malaysia

A security researcher found that tl;dv, an AI meeting recording platform with over 2 million users, has no tenant isolation in its Firestore meetings collection—any authenticated user can query all 181,874 meetings across every account, exposing joinable conference IDs for live Google Meet and Teams calls. The researcher demonstrated the flaw by walking into a live Google Meet belonging to the Malaysian Ministry of Education with 157 participants, and a US university startup call. The vulnerability was reported January 28, 2026; six months later the Firestore database remains open and the CTO never responded.

Why: If you build on Firebase/Firestore or Supabase, this is a concrete reminder that authentication is not authorization—every authenticated user querying a shared database needs row-level security or tenant-scoped query rules, or you leak every record. For Malaysian builders and government agencies, the fact that a live Ministry of Education call was joinable by a stranger shows the downstream risk of adopting third-party meeting bots that store conference IDs in poorly isolated databases. Anyone currently using tl;dv should assume their meeting links and participant data are exposed and evaluate whether to continue.

Tailscale experienced 19 separate SQLite database corruption incidents over six months, traced to a 16-year-old WAL-reset bug deep in SQLite. Their architecture uses one SQLite database per shard with a single Go writer, and their backup pipeline snapshots the full DB file to S3 every few minutes—corruption was first detected when a downstream data pipeline reading those S3 backups reported an error.

Why: If you run SQLite in production and take file-level backups or snapshots (especially with WAL mode), you should run PRAGMA integrity_check against your backups routinely—Tailscale's corruption was invisible to the live writer and only surfaced from the backup consumer. Anyone shipping SQLite-backed services should review whether their backup method correctly handles WAL state.

Attackers shut down a steam turbine and water treatment system at a Polish CHP plant by pivoting through a private cellular APN from a compromised wind farm to a WAGO controller with default admin credentials. CERT Polska, disclosing the December 2025 incident on August 8, called it the first real-world observed use of a private APN as an attack vector into industrial control networks. No CVE was identified and no single patch exists; the root causes were permissive client-to-client APN traffic, default credentials, and exposed management interfaces.

Why: If you build or manage anything behind a private APN or cellular IoT network, audit whether client isolation is enabled and whether devices can reach each other laterally—CERT found this misconfiguration is common across countries. The incident also reinforces that default credentials on reachable controllers remain a live attack path, but there is no specific software patch to apply here.