AI Weekly Malaysia

Microsoft, tracking the actor as Storm-3168, reports that JADEPUFFER-linked attackers used two compromised service principals in a single Azure tenant to run destructive operations over about 18 hours in early June 2026, deleting Azure Storage Accounts, SQL databases, Key Vaults, Function Apps, recovery protection locks, Virtual Machines, and App Services. JADEPUFFER was first documented by Sysdig as the first ransomware operation run end-to-end with an LLM, entering through a known Langflow flaw (CVE-2025-3248), and the same Langflow instance was later hit again with ENCFORGE, a Go-based strain that scans roughly 180 file extensions covering model checkpoints, vector databases, training datasets, and embedding indices, plus macOS Keychain stores, Xcode project files, and Apple Pages and Numbers documents.

Why: Three concrete decisions: patch Langflow for CVE-2025-3248 if you self-host it, because that was the documented entry point. Don't assume Azure-native recovery saves you here, since recovery protection locks were among the deleted resources, so keep copies of vector databases, model checkpoints, and training datasets outside the subscription that runs them. And inventory your service principals and what each one can delete, because the access in this incident came from service principals in one tenant, not from user accounts.