AI Weekly Malaysia

Wiz researchers found a GitHub Actions workflow injection vulnerability in Snowflake's public snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-net repository, where the jira_issue.yml workflow inserted attacker-controlled issue titles and bodies directly into a shell run block, exposing internal Jira credentials (JIRA_API_TOKEN for qa@snowflake.net). The workflow's guard checked github.event.pull_request.user.login on an issue event, which evaluated to an empty string and failed to block the exploit. Wiz's Red Agent system autonomously exploited the injection after an initial syntax error, obtaining an out-of-band callback and the Jira token with read access to engineering, security compliance, and bug bounty projects. Snowflake fixed it the same day it was reported (June 23, 2026) by passing values as environment variables to jq instead of inline expansion.

Why: If your GitHub Actions workflows interpolate issue titles, PR bodies, or any user-controlled GitHub event payload directly into shell run blocks, you are vulnerable to the same class of injection. Audit your .github/workflows for ${{ github.event.* }} expressions inside run: steps and replace them with environment variables passed as arguments. The broken guard here—checking a pull_request property on an issue event—is a subtle mistake anyone could replicate.